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Abstract
We report our findings on the properties of Flagg and Friedman’s translation from
Epistemic into Intuitionistic logic, which was proposed as the basis of a compre-
hensive proof method for the faithfulness of the Go¨del translation. We focus on
the propositional case and raise the issue of the admissibility of the translated ne-
cessitation rule. Then, we contribute to Flagg and Friedman’s program by giving
an explicit proof of the soundness of their translation.
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1. Introduction
In their work Epistemic and Intuitionistic Formal Systems (1986), Flagg and
Friedman gave a new proof–as an alternative to Goodman’s [1]–for the faithfulness
of the Go¨del translation (·)T from intuitionistic logic into epistemic modal logic S4
once (·)T is applied to Heyting arithmetic. They aimed at a comprehensive proof
method, to be deployed not only for arithmetic but for various formal systems
whose intuitionistic and epistemic versions are connected by a faithful translation:
⊢Epi A
T =⇒ ⊢Int A,
for any intuitionistic formula A. To this end, they proposed a class of embeddings
of epistemic into intuitionistic logic, which are, in a certain sense, inverse to (·)T .
In order to prove the faithfulness of the Go¨del translation, Flagg and Friedman
claim that their translation1, (·)
(E)
Γ , is sound in both the propositional and the
predicate calculus, and in arithmetic: i.e. for any epistemic formula B
⊢Epi B =⇒ ⊢Int B
(E)
Γ ,
1Notation and conventions will adhere as much as possible to Flagg and Friedman’s [2].
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where Γ is an arbitrary set of intuitionistic formulae and E is a chosen formula
from Γ.
In this article we discuss some issues about the proof of soundness of the generic
Flagg-and-Friedman translation (·)
(E)
Γ from Epistemic Propositional logic, shortly
EP (i.e. the modal logic S4), into Intuitionistic Propositional logic, IP.
Let Γ 6= ∅ be a finite set of IP-formulae and E ∈ Γ. Then, for each formula
A in EP, Flagg and Friedman define the formula A
(E)
Γ of IP (simply denoted by
A(E) when this is not ambiguous) as follows2, recursively on the structure3 of A :
A
(E)
Γ = ¬E¬EA, if A is atomic; (B0 ∧ B1)
(E)
Γ = (B
(E)
0 Γ ∧ B
(E)
1 Γ);
(B0 ∨B1)
(E)
Γ = ¬E¬E(B
(E)
0 Γ ∨ B
(E)
1 Γ); (B0 → B1)
(E)
Γ = (B
(E)
0 Γ → B
(E)
1 Γ);
(B)
(E)
Γ = ¬E¬E
∧
C∈ΓB
(C)
Γ .
Their basic result is the following theorem (Th. 1.8 in [2]), which states the
soundness of their translation in propositional calculus.
Theorem 1. Let A1, . . . , An, A be EP-formulae (possibly, n = 0). If
A1, . . . , An ⊢EP A,
then, for any finite set Γ of IP-formulae and for any E ∈ Γ,
A
(E)
1 Γ, . . . , A
(E)
n Γ ⊢IP A
(E)
Γ .
The authors suggest to prove Theorem 1 by induction on the length of deriva-
tions, but do not give enough details for a straightforward proof. In fact, a plain
and standard induction on the length of derivations would presuppose that the
generic (·)
(E)
Γ preserved the admissibility of all epistemic inference rules. Unfortu-
nately that allows counter-examples to the preservation of the necessitation rule,
as shown in Section 2 by means of an algebraic counter-model4. Thus, to optain a
successful proof, we define in Section 3 a more structured application of induction
which is not based on preservation of the necessitation rule and succeeds in proving
soundness in the propositional case.
2. Inadmissibility of the necessitation rule
If we were to prove Th. 1 above by a plain induction on length of derivation,
then, according to a standard procedure, we would expect that, for any finite
2Flagg and Friedman use ¬EA as an abbreviation for (A→ E).
3Please consider that Flagg and Friedman treat the sign of false, ⊥, as an atomic formula.
4For the intuitionistic algebraic semantics and its adequacy w.r.t. intuitionistic logic, please
see e.g. [3].
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Γ ⊆ LIP and any E ∈ Γ, the translation (·)
(E)
Γ would transform any EP-primitive
inference rule into an IP-admissible inference rule. It can be easily proved for all
EP-primitive rules but for the -introduction rule (denoted by  I):
 I A
A
if all open assumptions are of the form B.
In fact, there is at least one counter-example to the admissibility of every ( I)
(E)
Γ
in IP, as we show now.
Theorem 2. Let B and C be arbitrary atomic formulae (including ⊥) and let
E be a propositional letter distinct from B and C; moreover, let Γ = {C,E}. If
A = (E → B), then
⊢IP A
(E)
Γ ,
while
6⊢IP (A)
(E)
Γ .
Proof 1. Clearly A
(E)
Γ ⊢IP⊣ E → ¬E¬EB, hence A
(E)
Γ is an IP-theorem. Let us
then prove that, in contrast, (A)
(E)
Γ is not. Since (A)
(E)
Γ = ¬E¬E(A
(C) ∧A(E)),
thanks to Lemma 1.6/(v) of [2] and the ∧-elimination rule it suffices to prove that
6⊢IP ¬E¬EA
(C). We shall show algebraically that ¬E¬EA
(C) is not intuitionistically
valid, namely:
6|=IP ¬E¬E(¬C¬CE → ¬C¬CB);
thanks to the soundness of IP wrt. the algebraic semantics, we obtain the result.
In fact, let H = (H,≤) be a totally-ordered Heyting algebra5 (i.e. a chain)
such that b, c, e ∈ H and 0 ≤ b ≤ c < e < 1. Now, let v be a valuation in H
(i.e. a function from the set of propositional letters to H) such that, denoting by
vH the standard extension of v to the IP-formulae w.r.t. H, we obtain vH(B) = b,
vH(C) = c, and v(E) = e. Then
vH(¬E¬EA
(C)) = (e ⊲ c ⊲ c) ⊲ (b ⊲ c ⊲ c) ⊲ e ⊲ e = e 6= 1.
Hence vH(¬E¬EA
(C)) 6= 1. As a result, 6|=IP ¬E¬EA
(C).
5A Heyting algebra is a bounded lattice G = (G;;∪,∩; 0, 1) (where G is the subjacent set
of G, the relation  is the characteristic order of the lattice, ∪ and ∩ are the usual supremum
and infimum operators respectively, 0 and 1 the top and the bottom of G respectively) such that,
for any x, y ∈ G, there exists the relative pseudo-complement of x w.r.t. y, denoted by x ⊲ y, i.e.
there exists a z ∈ G such that, for any w ∈ G, we have: w  z ⇐⇒ w ∩ x  y.
3
3. A non-trivial proof of soundness
We shall propose a new, explicit proof for Th. 1, with a focus on the treatment
of the necesitation rule.
Proof 2. Let δ be an EP -derivation, in one arbitrary step of which a formula
A is asserted under the assumptions A1, . . . , An. Also, let Γ be an arbitrary finite
set of IP-formulae. We suppose, as induction hypothesis, that for each C ∈ Γ
the asserted formula in any previous step of δ, once translated w.r.t. C and Γ, is
provable in IP from the translations of the open assumptions concerning that step
of δ.
Consider the case that the assertion of A is obtained–through the I rule–from
an earlier step of δ. Let then B1, . . . , Bn, B be such that A1 = B1, . . . , An =
B,A = B. We claim that, for any E ∈ Γ,
¬E¬E
∧
C∈Γ
B
(C)
1 Γ, . . . ,¬E¬E
∧
C∈Γ
B
(C)
n Γ ⊢IP ¬E¬E
∧
C∈Γ
B
(C)
Γ .
To prove it, thanks to Lemma 1.6/ iv of [2] it suffices to prove, by fixing an arbitrary
formula D ∈ Γ, that ¬E¬EB
(D)
Γ is provable from the above-mentioned assumptions.
By the induction hypothesis we have (let us omit Γ from now on)
¬D¬D
∧
C
B
(C)
1 , . . . ,¬D¬D
∧
C
B(C)n ⊢IP B
(D),
from which, by Lemma 1.6/(vii) we obtain:
¬E¬E¬D¬D
∧
C
B
(C)
1 , . . . ,¬E¬E¬D¬D
∧
C
B(C)
n
⊢IP ¬E¬EB
(D).
Now, for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by Lemma 1.6/(i), (vii) we have the following:
¬E¬E
∧
C
B
(C)
i
⊢IP ¬E¬E¬D¬D
∧
C
B
(C)
i
.
Finally, by composition we get to:
¬E¬E
∧
C
B
(C)
1 , . . . ,¬E¬E
∧
C
B(C)
n
⊢IP ¬E¬EB
(D).

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